Strengths in system's response | Weaknesses in system's response |
---|---|
Clinical staff going to Omagh to help initial response | External communications poor and no back-up with ACCOLC during telephone blackout |
Distribution of victims between four hospitals for initial care | No direct communication between ambulance and hospitals |
Triggering of the MIP at the RGHT without waiting for absolute proof that it was required | Delayed realization of the use of ambulance control to relay communication between TCH and the RGHT |
Utilization of day-shift staff and night-shift staff at the RGHT and having replacements for later in the incident response | Internal communication reliant on overloaded internal telephone system and face-to-face meetings |
Public Relations staff tasked with ensuring good quality, timely information for relatives | Little communication between hospitals regarding victims' identity and status (for families with victims in more than one hospital) |
Appropriate triage of small number of patients for tertiary care to regional center | Advantages of helicopter negated by lack of previous experience and no helipad at regional center |
Availability of all trauma-related specialties on one site at the RGHT | GICU busy initially, discharging and transferring patients to vacate beds. Too few beds in system for a larger incident |
Single portal of entry to the RGHT to avoid missed injury and direct admission to surgical wards | Patient identity mistaken due to early acceptance of spurious information |
 | System for tracking patients in regional centre not used by surgical teams for follow-up |